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Do political connections buffer firms from or bind firms to the government? To examine this theoretical puzzle, wedistinguish two types of managerial political connections, ascribed and achieved, and theorize that these different
types of ties either buffer firms from or bind firms to government demands. Furthermore, we propose that these effects are
contingent on both industrial and regional institutional conditions. We test our framework with a unique panel data set of
privately controlled listed firms’ charitable donations in China from 2001 to 2012. We find that firms whose executives
have ascribed bureaucratic connections are more likely to use their connections as a buffer from governmental donation
pressure, particularly in competitive industries and less market-oriented regions, whereas in state-monopolized industries
this buffering effect is reduced. In contrast, achieved political connections are more likely to serve a binding function
that facilitates donation, particularly in state-monopolized industries and more market-oriented regions, but in less market-
oriented regions, they buffer firms from the pressure to donate. Our research contributes to the literatures on the effects of
political connections, the institutional contingencies of political connections, and the relationship between corporate social
responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activities (CPA).
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Introduction
As institutional linkages that span firms and govern-
mental authorities, firms’ political connections are a key
component of corporate political strategy in both devel-
oped and emerging economies (Hillman 2005, Hillman
et al. 1999, Peng and Luo 2000). However, the effects
of political connections on firm behavior and outcomes
are not clear (Sun et al. 2012). Many studies focus on
the benefits from such linkages and indicate that polit-
ical connections have a “buffering” effect; that is, they
provide a buffer for the organization from competitive
and regulatory forces via access to information, influ-
ence, and legitimacy (Hillman 2005, Hillman et al. 1999,
Lester et al. 2008, Peng and Luo 2000). Research has
shown that firms can employ their political capital to
shield themselves from unwanted political interference,
unfavorable regulations, and/or various forms of gov-
ernment rent expropriation (Mellahi et al. 2016). Even
in the United States, political connections have been
shown to help firms when they deal with regulators
(Correia 2014, Yu and Yu 2011). In emerging markets,
such a buffering effect is seen as an effective mechanism
to protect firms from government rent-seeking behavior
(Chen et al. 2011, Dieleman and Boddewyn 2012).
In contrast, other studies consider these connections
from the perspective of the government and emphasize
the necessary costs of such linkages for the firm. From
this perspective, political connections have a “binding”
effect, i.e., they are a mechanism of co-optation, leading
firms to be more likely to meet government’s require-
ments (Guthrie and McQuarrie 2008, Marquis and Qian
2014), and correspondingly expose firms to government
expropriation (Boubakri et al. 2008, Caprio and Croci
2008). Thus, prior research has shown that organiza-
tions with political connections are more likely to pursue
social objectives that are encouraged by the government
or politicians, and this is due to their concerns about
legitimacy (Marquis and Qian 2014), increasing flow of
critical resources (Kostka and Zhou 2013), and interest
in obtaining the support of critical stakeholders (Wang
and Qian 2011).
These contradictory perspectives and empirical find-
ings present an unresolved theoretical puzzle regarding
the effects of political ties on business; that is, do firm
political ties provide a strategic benefit for firms through
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increased access and influence, or do they result in firms
being co-opted, and so lead to them being more likely
to conform to government expectations?
We aim to clarify these conflicting findings by devel-
oping a more nuanced conceptualization of different
types of political ties and the contingencies that affect
whether these different types of political ties will be
more or less likely to provide buffering or binding
effects. We identify and define two types of political
ties. First is business executives’ prior government work-
ing experience. We define these ties as ascribed bureau-
cratic connections because they represent background
characteristics the individual executive obtained before
entering business. Second is prestigious appointment to
state organs such as congresses or political councils,
which we define as achieved political connections, as
the formation of these political ties result from execu-
tives’ or their firms’ achievements. Our study identifies
how these different types of connections indicate dif-
ferent business–government relationships and theorizes
why they have different effects on firm behavior.
Furthermore, we consider how the effects of these
types of connections are differentially affected by the
firm’s resource dependencies such as the level of state
monopoly in the firm’s industry and the quality of mar-
ket development in the firm’s locality. Since firms face
different institutional situations across industries and
regions in terms of the degree of resource dependence
upon the government, government intervention, property
rights protection, and contract enforcement effectiveness
(Li et al. 2008, Ma et al. 2013), they might also use their
political connections for different purposes across indus-
tries and regions. Our basic argument is that the level of
resource dependence of the focal firm upon the govern-
ment, in combination with the nature of political connec-
tions, determines whether political connections buffer
the firm from, or bind the firm to, the government.
To test our theory and hypotheses, we investigate the
relationship between political connections and corporate
charitable donations for privately controlled firms (as
opposed to state-owned enterprises (SOEs)) in China.
This is an excellent context to examine the effects of
different types of political ties on firm behavior as
the government is an important initiator, stakeholder,
and audience of corporate charitable donations (Wang
and Qian 2011). On the one hand, political connec-
tions might buffer firms against making donations since
political connections confer power on the firm, which
may protect firms from government expropriation. On
the other hand, political connections might also bind
firms to the government, since political connections may
create obligation and higher government expectations
(Marquis and Qian 2014) such that firms may feel espe-
cially obliged to donate. Privately controlled firms are
particularly attuned to building political connections,
considering their need for resources, political protection,
and legitimacy (Peng and Luo 2000, Xin and Pearce
1996). Furthermore, the underlying incentives driving
privately controlled firm donations are very different
from those of SOEs, given SOEs’ intrinsic duty to take
care of social welfare and managerial agency problems
(Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Our sample includes all such
firms listed on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges from 2001 to 2012.
We offer three contributions to the literature. First, we
theoretically and empirically differentiate between two
types of political ties—ascribed versus achieved—and
show that this distinction affects whether political ties
primarily serve a buffering or binding function. Unpack-
ing the heterogeneity of political ties (Sun et al. 2015,
Zheng et al. 2015) is important to better understand the
underlying nature and function of such connections and
so clarify the aforementioned theoretical puzzle. Sec-
ond, we identify institutional contingencies that affect
firms’ resource dependence under which political con-
nections are used strategically as a buffering or binding
force. While existing literature focuses on either indus-
try (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983) or region (e.g.,
Marquis and Battilana 2009), we differentiate and com-
pare the moderating effects of the two. Third, we address
the relationship (and potential integration) between cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate politi-
cal activity (CPA)—two important nonmarket strategies
(Sun et al. 2012, Mellahi et al. 2016, Werner 2015). We
show that, depending on different types of political con-
nections and institutional conditions, CSR and CPA are
either complements or substitutes.
Institutional Characteristics and the
Nature of Donation in China
Over the past three decades, China has undergone a fun-
damental and comprehensive set of institutional changes.
Before 1978, China instituted a planned economy in
which the state played the central role in resource allo-
cation and industrial operations. During this period, the
communist ethos and state control of resources pre-
vented accumulation of private wealth, and examples of
Western philanthropic traditions, including volunteering
and wealthy individuals acting as philanthropists, were
virtually unknown (McGinnis et al. 2009). After 1978,
China adopted elements of a market economy, increas-
ing the role of the market in allocating resources while
retaining state control of many crucial aspects of the
economy. Thus, a “hybrid” or “mixed” economy devel-
oped, whereby both the market and the state simulta-
neously influence firm behavior (Fligstein and Zhang
2011). In the most recent period, while the market has
played an increasing role in allocating resources and
shaping firm operations (Fan et al. 2011), the govern-
ment is still a key stakeholder driving a number of
business strategies in China, particularly in regard to
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firms’ social responsibilities (Marquis and Qian 2014).
Thus, prior research has shown that managerial political
connections are a key lever through which the govern-
ment can shape corporate charitable donations (Ma and
Parish 2006).
Two prominent institutional characteristics affect the
relationship between political connections and corporate
charitable donation in China. First, the government is
a critical source of resources and legitimacy in China.
Since governments at various levels still maintain the
power to allocate key resources, issue licenses and per-
mits (for business entry), ratify projects, grant subsidies,
allow tax arrears, and provide access to infrastructure
(Shi et al. 2014), political connections with the govern-
ment are of particular importance for business survival
and success (Li and Zhang 2007, Peng and Luo 2000).
Government control of resources also makes it possible
for the government to co-opt businesses/elites by grant-
ing resources and legitimacy in exchange for conformity.
Accordingly, corporate executives strive to maintain
goodwill with the government—including through mak-
ing charitable donations (Ma and Parish 2006). Mean-
while, the government also seeks to co-opt business
leaders as a means of maintaining control of the econ-
omy and society (Dickson 2003). For example, the
Chinese government has sought to incorporate corpo-
rate elites (particularly successful entrepreneurs of pri-
vately controlled enterprises) into the political system by
appointing them as delegates to the People’s Congress
(PC; China’s legislative body) or to the Chinese Peo-
ple’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC; China’s
political consultative body) (Dickson 2003). The polit-
ical appointments better enable the corporate elites to
communicate and negotiate with the government on
important policies affecting their business such as entry
permit, tax benefits, preferential financing, etc. (Dickson
2003, Li et al. 2008, Wu et al. 2012). In exchange, the
government might expect these incorporated business
elites and their firms to share responsibilities with the
government, such as making donations in the name of
the public good (Wang and Qian 2011).
Second, the Chinese government frequently exhibits
a strong “grabbing” hand alongside a “helping” hand
(Shleifer and Vishny 1994) because of the lack of checks
and balances in the political system, poor legal infras-
tructure, absence of a free press, and nontransparent
government decision making (Boisot and Child 1996,
Hoskisson et al. 2000). While market reform unleashed
forces for economic growth, it also created various prob-
lems such as widening the gap between the rich and
poor, worsening labor relations, and deteriorating envi-
ronmental conditions. Because of the increasing social
tension, the central government under the Hu Jintao
administration (2002–2012) adopted the socioeconomic
ideology of building a “harmonious society” which pro-
vided a legitimate rationale for the government and
government-organized “nongovernmental organizations”
(GONGOs) to pressure firms for donations. Further-
more, considering that China has decentralized the state
bureaucracy, fiscal difficulties and social service gaps
exist in many places (West and Wong 1995), corpora-
tions are increasingly called on to shoulder responsibility
with the government.
In addition, unlike in Western countries, where inde-
pendent NGOs are a key pillar of civil society (Clemens
and Guthrie 2010) and social services are increasingly
undertaken by NGOs and even businesses, in China, the
government imposes tight restrictions on the establish-
ment and operation of NGOs. Purely private and inde-
pendent NGOs face tremendous hurdles to set up and
operate. As a result, existing NGOs are mostly govern-
ment organized (Foster 2001), either organizations that
were previously government agencies or were specifi-
cally set up by governmental authorities. For example,
the most prominent NGOs in the field of charity, such
as China Charity, the Red Cross Society of China, and
the China Soong Ching Ling Foundation, are all estab-
lished and controlled by the government. With their offi-
cial background and governmental backing, these NGOs
often have the power to solicit donations from business
organizations. We obtained data from the China Char-
ity report published by the China Charity Information
Centre (2007–2014) and summarized the findings in Fig-
ure 1. The figure shows that more than 90% of donations
go to charity institutes with a government background.1
Widespread instances of apportionment, imposition,
and extortion by government or GONGOs have been
well documented in the media.2 Hence, “charity appor-
tion” or “forced donation” has become a well-known
phenomenon in China.3 For example, an investigative
report documented the processes of forced donation by
the government of Shenmu County in Shanxi Province
(Wang 2011). When the Shenmu government set up
Figure 1 Percentage of Donations to Government Affiliated
Charities
0
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Source. China Charity report.
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three foundations to take care of social welfare and fos-
ter sustainable development in 2011, instead of rely-
ing on public financing or voluntary contributions, an
RMB 3 billion target was assigned and donations were
imposed on every firm and public employee in the
county. Thus, as prior research has shown, in China, the
government is an important initiator, stakeholder, and
audience of social responsibility activities such as cor-
porate charitable donation (Marquis and Qian 2014).
Political Connections, Institutions,
and Donation
The extensive literature on corporate political connec-
tions demonstrates that firms are strategic in manag-
ing their relationships with the government to achieve
competitive advantage (Hillman et al. 2004, Schuler
et al. 2002). We advance two specific areas within this
broad research domain. First, we differentiate different
types of political connections—ascribed and achieved—
and examine their functions. Second, we identify insti-
tutional conditions under which political connections
buffer firms from or bind firms to the government. The
theory we develop below contains the following two
insights: on the one hand, the two types of political
connections serve different functions, either buffering
or binding; on the other hand, such functions can be
strengthened, weakened, or even shifted depending on
the firms’ institutional conditions.
Ascribed and Achieved Political Connections
To assess and reconcile the seemingly contradictory
roles of political connections on corporate charita-
ble donation, we distinguish two types of politi-
cal connections—ascribed bureaucratic connections and
achieved political connections. While the concepts of
ascribed versus achieved were developed in sociol-
ogy (Linton 1936, Stark 2007), we use these two
terms to indicate strikingly different types of political
connections.
Ascribed bureaucratic connections refer to political
ties that executives built as government officials before
they entered the business world (similar to ex-politicians
in Hillman’s 2005 research). In sociology, ascribed
attributes of an actor result from background conditions
or an individual’s history such as family origins. In
our context, bureaucratic connections were accumulated
during executives’ earlier careers as full-time govern-
ment employees or officials before they became business
executives. Previous government working experience
endows them with unique information about government
bureaucracy and operation (Hillman 2005), a channel
of communication and access to existing local govern-
ment leaders due to their common language, shared
experience, and collegial/networked relationships. Since
this type of political connection was typically cultivated
over a relatively long time period and constitutes an
important component of these individuals’ careers, it
often embodies trust and interpersonal loyalty (with gov-
ernment officials) and is thus relatively stable, so can
effectively protect their firm’s interests. As former gov-
ernment “insiders,” such experiences often indicate deep
political embeddedness.
Achieved political connections, on the other hand,
result from efforts and achievements from executives’
current roles and obligations; in our context, they are
defined as political appointments to prestigious state
organs acquired after executives became successful busi-
ness leaders. Achieved political connections are largely
a result of ongoing cooperation and favor exchange
between business and the government, i.e., resulting
from corporate political activities (CPAs) and efforts and
the government’s interest in co-opting business leaders.
As political “outsiders,” these executives gain political
connections through efforts/achievements. Only when
firms become large and executives become successful is
it possible for these executives to be appointed to these
political bodies. For instance, Dickson (2003) finds that
Chinese government rewarded the entrepreneurs of pri-
vate enterprises via political appointments. Given term
limits,4 political ties via such appointments often last for
a shorter period.
We theorize that these two types of connections dif-
fer in how and when they are accumulated and reflect
different business–government relationships, and so it
is reasonable to expect that they have different impacts
on firm behavior. As social capital in stock, ascribed
bureaucratic connections create a “detaching effect,”
allowing firms to distance themselves from the govern-
ment while protecting their interests. Those former gov-
ernment officials do not have any formal obligation to
shoulder responsibilities with the government. Further-
more, their network with government leaders will effec-
tively protect them from rent expropriation.
Achieved political connections are earned by firms’/
executives’ efforts to meet government expectations, or
the government identifies them as important to co-opt,
thus creating a strong “attaching effect” between firms
and the government. Firms’ compliance or active align-
ment with government expectations further advances and
protects their interests as well as consolidates their exec-
utives’ political status. Therefore, we generally expect
that executives with achieved political connections are
more likely to meet government expectations. Table 1
summarizes the differences of the two types of political
connections.
Ascribed Bureaucratic Connections and Corporate
Charitable Donation. The ascribed bureaucratic connec-
tions bring resources and leverage, which are likely
to buffer firms from external claims and impositions
including donations. First, such connections provide
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Table 1 Comparisons of the Two Types of Political Connections
Ascribed bureaucratic connections Achieved political connections
Definition Based on actors’ background
characteristics
Reflecting or a result of actors’ current position
Expression in China Former government officials before taking
current position
Appointment to political body or council after achieving
current position
Tie cultivation mechanisms Deep political embeddedness; political
insiders now working outside the
government
Result of CPA, transaction/exchange between business and
government; political outsiders now with a position inside
the government
Functions Knowledge, skill, network Political recognition, network, responsibility
Pressures Detaching effect; no government/social
expectation
Attaching effect; expected to shoulder obligations and
duties
Outcome Buffering Binding, co-optation
unique information and knowledge about bureaucratic
operation, which, because of its complexity, is often very
expensive or difficult for a firm to obtain (Hillman et al.
1999). For instance, such knowledge in China enables
firms to differentiate various GONGOs and government
requests, complying with serious requests while ignor-
ing less consequential ones. Second, their network pro-
vides a channel of communication or access to existing
politicians and bureaucrats, which can protect firms from
excess imposition and potential sanction as well. Third,
their experience and skill also help them deal with gov-
ernment agencies/officials more successfully, and avoid
offending the government even if they do not donate. For
the government and GONGOs, firms without political
connections are also more likely to become “soft targets”
of imposition, since they have the weakest incentives and
ability to resist external demands (Baron et al. 2011).
These arguments particularly apply to privately con-
trolled firms in China. As a relatively new organizational
form in China’s emerging market, privately controlled
firms are vulnerable to various claims and impositions,
and are often subject to arbitrary harassment from the
government (Li et al. 2008). Executives with political
connections, however, may mitigate or even overcome
this disadvantage (Xin and Pearce 1996). Therefore:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Firms with executives who have
ascribed bureaucratic connections are less likely to
donate compared to firms whose executives do not have
such connections.
Achieved Political Connections and Corporate Chari-
table Donation. There is some rationale suggesting that
achieved political connections might also serve as a
buffer from governmental pressure, providing political
clout that may allow firms to fend off external claims.
And executives who lack political connections may be
more active in making donations to create goodwill with
the government, with the purpose of cultivating political
connections (Ma and Parish 2006). While these argu-
ments may apply under some conditions that we elabo-
rate below, we argue that on average, achieved political
connections are more likely to bind firms to the govern-
ment and thus facilitate donation.
First, achieved political connections indicate more
of an ongoing exchange relationship between business
elites (and their organizations) and the government,
whereby the government provides the political recogni-
tion, social status, and prestige, and as a response, firms
are likely to be motivated to take the lead in social con-
tributions out of both positive duty and negative duty
(Swanson 1999). In terms of positive duty, executives
with achieved political connections might have better
understanding and greater information about the gov-
ernment concern as well as higher awareness of corpo-
rate social responsibility, and thus are more likely to
adopt the government’s perspective and be committed
to donating for societal wellbeing. In addition, based
on the Confucian social model of role transition (i.e.,
the individuals should transition from self-orientation to
social-orientation after they succeed), prior research has
suggested that successful entrepreneurs are more likely
to be motivated by prosocial concerns (Li and Liang
2015). In terms of negative duty, achieved political con-
nections generate higher expectations by the government
and the general public, and thus firms are pressured to
take greater initiative in social welfare to be consis-
tent with their political status (Marquis and Qian 2014).
Finally, the fear of losing political appointments also
binds firms to government demands, because such politi-
cal status could be vulnerable to competition from exec-
utives without political connections who desire such
positions.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Firms with executives who have
achieved political connections are more likely to donate
compared to firms whose executives do not have such
connections.
Resource Dependence and Effects of
Political Connections
We further argue that whether political connections
will buffer or bind firms is also affected by the level
of resource dependence of firms upon the government
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(Oliver 1991, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Given that the
level of resource dependence of firms on the government
is contingent upon the institutional environment in which
they operate, we posit that the effects of political connec-
tions on corporate charitable donations vary across dif-
ferent institutional settings, following the argument that
the institutional environment shapes firm strategy (e.g.,
Kozhikode and Li 2012, Marquis and Raynard 2015).
The institutional arrangement of industry in China
determines the extent to which entry to the industry and
access to critical resources is controlled by the gov-
ernment. With the legacy of a planned economy, gov-
ernment intervention in China is mainly exemplified by
industry regulation (Ortega et al. 2011). For example,
the government controls licenses and permits for access
to critical industries including finance, energy, utilities,
transportation, and certain heavy industries in the name
of national interest (Eaton 2013). Without government
permission, privately controlled firms cannot enter such
industries (Gallagher 2006). Moreover, the government
is deeply involved in many industry-specific regulations
(e.g., Gallagher 2006) and can intervene via discrimi-
nating policies such as preferential tax, financing, etc.
(Wu et al. 2012). Industry hence constitutes a firm’s task
environment (Thompson 1967), which is critical for firm
survival and success.
In contrast, regional market characteristics are more
indicative of the quality of the general institutional
infrastructure, such as government service/intervention,
legal protection of property rights, contractual enforce-
ments, and other related factors (Fan et al. 2011, Ma
et al. 2013), since legal apparatuses are influenced by
local governments in China instead of standing as inde-
pendent entities (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008). The
resource dependence of the firm on regional institutional
environment is comparatively less severe than that on
industry. For instance, business entry/permits in certain
industries are vital for firms, while firms can choose to
go to court or to circumvent lawsuits5 depending upon
the effectiveness of the legal apparatus in a region (Firth
et al. 2011). In general, if industry environment deter-
mines life and death for the firm, then regional environ-
ment influences the quality of the firm’s life.
Level of State Monopoly of Industry and the Effect of
Political Connections. The extent to which a privately
controlled firm uses political connections to buffer or
bind differs across industries. As Baron (1995) suggests,
the importance of a firm’s political strategy is positively
associated with the degree of government control over
the opportunities in the industry where the firm resides.
Thus, firms relying more on the government and firms in
regulated industries have been shown to be more active
in political activities and are more likely to combine
various political activities (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001,
Hillman 2005, Peng and Luo 2000, Schuler et al. 2002).
Brown et al. (2006) find that firms in more regulated
industries are more likely to make charitable contribu-
tions to garner government goodwill. Active CSR is also
used to gain legitimacy in some industries such as the
Tobacco industry (Palazzo and Richter 2005).
The above rationale is applicable to the relationship
between political connections and corporate charitable
donation in state-monopolized industries in China. Firms
in state-monopolized industries are more dependent on
the government for license approval/renewal, access to
government-controlled resources and preferential treat-
ment, and subject to frequent government intervention
(Eaton 2013). Resource dependence upon the govern-
ment makes firms more likely to comply with govern-
ment/GONGO demands or even proactively to engage
in donation to gain government goodwill (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). Meanwhile, since state-monopolized
industries are politically salient and attract more gov-
ernment attention, and privately controlled firms in such
industries also have a stronger need to gain legitimacy
and improve their image, they can not risk defying gov-
ernment demands. To keep the status quo or seek greater
advantage (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994), firms with
political connections—both ascribed and achieved—
have incentives to continuously maintain or further im-
prove their relationship with the government. Conse-
quently, the buffering effect of ascribed bureaucratic
connections would be weaker and the binding effect
of achieved political connections would be stronger in
state-monopolized industries.
Furthermore, in state-monopolized industries, firms
with political connections would have better understand-
ing of government concerns (e.g., identifying significant
social and political issues) and gain more benefits
by aligning with government expectations. Therefore,
existing political connections might serve as channel
and bridge through which firms build further linkages
by making donations, strengthening their competitive
advantage as well as hindering their rivals in the indus-
try (Delmas et al. 2016, McWilliams et al. 2002). In
contrast, highly competitive industries are more open to
market competition and less controlled by the govern-
ment. Firms in such industries are more conscious of
committing resources to the market rather than catering
to the government to survive competition (Davies and
Walters 2004). As a result, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 3A (H3A). The buffering effect of exec-
utives’ ascribed bureaucratic connections against dona-
tion pressure is weaker for firms in state-monopolized
industries than those in competitive industries.
Hypothesis 3B (H3B). The binding effect of execu-
tives’ achieved political connections that lead them to
donate is stronger for firms in state-monopolized indus-
tries than those in competitive industries.
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Quality of Regional Market Development and the
Effect of Political Connections. Regional institutional
differences are mainly exemplified by the quality of mar-
ket development of the regions where firms are located.
More market-oriented regions have a higher quality of
market development and better legal infrastructure such
as protection of property rights and contract enforce-
ment, while less market-oriented regions usually are
characterized by a higher degree of government interven-
tion, administrative harassment, and poorer legal infras-
tructure (Li et al. 2008, Zhou and Poppo 2010). Based on
the same logic presented above on how industry moder-
ates the effect of political ties, it is reasonable to expect
that political connections would be more likely to bind
firms to the government in less market-oriented regions
(as in more state-monopolized industries), since firms
rely more on the government and thus cannot afford the
cost of defying government demands in these regions.
However, because of the different nature of institu-
tional pressure associated with region relative to industry
(Marquis and Battilana 2009, Oliver 1991), we argue
that in less market-oriented regions, both types of polit-
ical connections are more likely to serve as a buffer
against external impositions. First, the regional institu-
tional environment creates a lower degree of resource
dependence of the focal firm upon the government
relative to industry, which increases the likelihood of
organizational resistance (Oliver 1991). Thus, politi-
cal connections in less market-oriented regions may be
used to defend firm interests by resisting government
expropriation, effectively mitigating the binding func-
tion of political connections in these regions. Second,
the regional environment consists of multiple, complex,
and fragmented constituents (e.g., various government
bureaus might have different interests), which also cre-
ates room for organizational resistance (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978, p. 27). Comparatively, industry reg-
ulation is more focused and concentrated in China.
Third, the degree of interconnectedness of actors differs
between the two institutions. While there is typically
higher interconnectedness of actors in the industry envi-
ronment (as a legacy of China’s planned economy and
focus of industry regulation), actors in regional institu-
tional environment are more loosely connected, which
further alleviates the risk of organizational resistance;
that is, the nature of institutional pressures associated
with region makes organizational resistance feasible.
As a result, in less market-oriented regions, firms are
likely to use political connections to defy government
demands. The stronger the grabbing hand of the govern-
ment, the more likely the firm is motivated to cultivate
political connections to prevent rent seeking. In places
where market institutions are less developed, political
connections are likely to be used to protect firm interests
(Xin and Pearce 1996, Zhou and Poppo 2010), including
but not limited to defying rent expropriation. Therefore,
Hypothesis 4A (H4A). The buffering effect of exec-
utives’ ascribed bureaucratic connections against
donation pressure is stronger for firms in less market-
oriented regions than those in more market-oriented
regions.
Hypothesis 4B (H4B). The binding effect of exec-
utives’ achieved political connections that lead them
to donate is weaker for firms in less market-oriented
regions than those in more market-oriented regions.
Methods
Data and Sample
Our sample consists of all privately controlled firms
listed on both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges
from 2001 to 2012. Our data set was drawn from sev-
eral data sources including the China Stock Market
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, company
annual reports, and company websites. The CSMAR and
Sinofin databases are widely used in studies on China’s
listed companies, and they provide credible informa-
tion about companies’ background and financial statistics
(e.g., Wang and Qian 2011). After deleting 123 observa-
tions of 15 firms with missing values, the final sample
consists of 820 firms and 5,803 firm-year observations.
Donation information is available in the CSMAR
database from 2001 to 2006. We extended such infor-
mation to 2012 by collecting donation data directly
from the “notes to financial reports” (termed as “corpo-
rate (charitable) donations”) in company annual reports.
Executives’ political connections and functional back-
ground were collected manually from brief biographi-
cal descriptions of the firms’ top executives provided
by CSMAR, company websites, and some professional
financial news sites (e.g., Sina Finance). If information
was still unavailable, we searched for the firm and the
executive’s name as the keywords in Baidu—the most
commonly used search engine in China—and collected
the information accordingly.
Dependent Variables
We examined both the likelihood and amount of dona-
tion that a firm made in a certain year between 2001 and
2012. (i) The likelihood of donation is coded 1 for firms
that donated in a given year (“donor”) and 0 for those
that did not donate, and (ii) we took the logarithm of the
total donation for cases with positive amount of donation
(amount of donation), leaving those cases with no dona-
tion as 0. Among firms that donated, the average dona-
tion amount is approximately ¥1,291,410 (US$174,988,
based on the 2007 exchange rate), accounting for 1.7%
of the firms’ profit and 5.2% of the firms’ cash flow.
Independent Variables
We distinguished between ascribed bureaucratic con-
nections and achieved political connections of the
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chairperson of the company’s board of directors. In
China the most powerful executive position in the firm is
the board chair (Li and Liang 2015). The Company Law
in China stipulates that the chair is the legal represen-
tative of the company and is accountable for important
company decisions.
Ascribed bureaucratic connection was measured by
whether the chair had only government working experi-
ence before serving as the chair. For privately controlled
firms, such a stint usually occurred before the chair
joined the company. This measure is widely used and
well established in the existing literature to capture the
political connection (e.g., Faccio 2006, Fan et al. 2007).
Achieved political connection was measured by
whether a firm’s chair was only serving as a delegate
to People’s Congress or Chinese People’s Political Con-
sultative Conference. While these bodies exist at five
different hierarchical levels from township to national,
given the elite status of executives in Chinese publicly
listed firms, we only considered the higher prestige,
national- and provincial-level PC/CPPCC. The results
remain similar when including other levels of PC/CPPCC
membership.
Moderators
Level of State Monopoly of Industry. Based on well-
established calculations of state monopoly across indus-
tries in China (e.g., Jin 2005, Song et al. 2011), we
calculated the degree of state monopoly by computing
the proportion of SOEs’ sales to those of the total indus-
try (at three-digit level) for each year. A higher score
indicates a higher level of state monopoly, i.e., there
is stronger state control of those industries. Examples
of highly state-monopolized industries are electricity,
finance, telecommunications, and petroleum.
Quality of Regional Market Development. We capture
the quality of market development of the firm’s head-
quarters province using the well-established provincial
marketization indices developed by the National Eco-
nomic Research Institute (Fan et al. 2011). We reverse
coded this variable by subtracting the value of marke-
tization index for each province from 12, which is the
maximum possible value, to keep the direction of the
measure consistent with our hypotheses. A higher value
indicates a lower quality of regional market develop-
ment. Since the most recently available indices were
updated to 2009, and the relative degrees of marketiza-
tion of provinces are stable over the years, we used the
2009 values for 2010 to 2012. Results are unchanged if
we restrict the sample to the 2001 to 2009 data.
Control Variables
We controlled for a wide range of characteristics of
the firm, its leader, and its industry. A number of firm
characteristics may affect the likelihood and amount of
donation. We included firm size, which was measured as
the logarithm of revenue (Grant et al. 1988), since poli-
tics are more important to larger and more visible firms
(Agrawal and Knoeber 2001). Prior research suggests
that ownership concentration allows owners to moni-
tor effectively and thus to discourage management from
making donations (Brown et al. 2006). We controlled
for ownership concentration by the percentage of shares
owned by the five largest shareholders. We employed
the number of years since the firm’s initial public offer-
ing (IPO) to control for the influence of firm exposure
to stock market. Furthermore, we used return on assets
(ROA) to measure firm performance (Wang and Qian
2011). We lagged firm performance by one year to avoid
endogeneity arising from reverse causation. We also con-
trolled for slack resources, measured as cash flow over
total assets (Wang and Qian 2011). Additionally, we cal-
culated sales expenditure over revenue to measure adver-
tising intensity since research suggests that firms that
emphasize sales and marketing are more image con-
scious and so more likely to donate (e.g., Navarro 1988).
To avoid undue influence from outliers, we winsorized
variables ROA and sales expenditures over revenues at
the 1% level.
We controlled for characteristics of a firm’s chair,
since different leadership characteristics might affect
firm donation (Chin et al. 2013, Li and Liang 2015).
Such characteristics include (1) chairs with both politi-
cal connections, which helps to rule out any conflicting
effects of two different types of political connections;
(2) age, measured in year; (3) gender, which equals 1
if a chair is male; (4) educational attainment, which is
coded as 6 for doctorate degree, 5 for master’s degree, 4
for undergraduate degree, 3 for high school, 2 for middle
school, 1 for primary school, and 0 for those below pri-
mary school (Thomas et al. 1991); and (5) tenure, mea-
sured by the years in the position. We also used duality
of chair and CEO to measure whether the position of
chair and chief executive officer (CEO) were held by
the same person, to proxy executive power (Sauerwald
et al. 2016). In addition, top executives with different
functional backgrounds have different strategic priori-
ties (e.g., Hambrick and Mason 1984), and those with
sales or marketing background may develop a different
strategic perception of charitable giving. We coded chair
has sales/marketing background using the position and
department affiliation of the executive’s longest working
experience (Thomas et al. 1991).
Studies on practice diffusion find that a practice
adopted by socially proximate firms (for example, those
in the same industry) will be more quickly adopted by
the focal firm (e.g., Davis and Greve 1997). We thus
controlled for the influence of three-digit level indus-
try average donation, i.e., average donation likelihood of
firms in industry and average donation amount of firms
in industry for the likelihood and amount of donation
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each year. Last, we included year dummies to capture
time period variation.
Estimation Methods
Since the likelihood of donation (donor) is a binary
variable, a probit model is appropriate.6 It is not pos-
sible to use fixed effects in probit models due to the
“incidental parameter problem” (i.e., there are too many
parameters to be estimated), so we employed probit
models with random effects estimation to account for the
heterogeneity of each firm (Lancaster 2000). We con-
ducted a number of tests and robustness checks to ver-
ify that our random effects probit model returned valid
results. First, we performed a Hausman test to compare
the results from a Logistic model with both fixed and
random effects estimations and found that there were
no systematic differences and thus random effects esti-
mation is appropriate (Hausman 1978). In addition, we
conducted the Breusch–Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan
1979) to compare the results from random effects and
pooled estimation and found that the pooled estimation
would not deliver consistent results.
Our second dependent variable, the amount of dona-
tion, is contingent upon the decision to donate, and this
introduces selection bias if we use a linear model to esti-
mate the amount of donation directly. We thus adopted
the two-step Heckman selection model, where the first
step is likelihood of donation as described above, and the
second step is then amount of donation based on those
that have donated and controls for the inverse Mill’s ratio
from the first step (Wang and Qian 2011).
More importantly, considering that firms may choose
executives with political connections, the key variables
in our study—political connections—maybe endoge-
nous. To address this issue, we used the propensity score
matching (PSM) method, which is commonly used in
management research on firms’ social networks (Choi
et al. 2014, Haveman et al. 2016). Propensity score
matching alleviates endogeneity concerns by matching
firms receiving treatment (obtaining political connection)
or not on the observable variables, and thus eliminat-
ing spurious results caused by these variables (Dehejia
and Wahba 2002, Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Using a
multinomial logistic model, we predicted the likelihood
of selection into treatments (ascribed, achieved, and
both; those without any political connections serve as
the control)7 with all the observable exogenous (control)
variables. PSM computes the propensity score for each
observation, i.e., the predicted probability of acquiring
political connection or not and of what type, and based
on this score a matched sample of firms with and with-
out political connections is formed.8 The finally matched
sample contains more than 65% of the original obser-
vations, among which 64% of the firms donated, com-
parable to the original sample. We conducted a wide
range of tests to assure matching quality. Tests indicate
that (a) the differences in the variables between treated
and control groups are not statistically significant at the
5% level, the accepted threshold (Rosenbaum and Rubin
1983), and (b) the pseudo-R2 of multinomial logis-
tic regression after the matching was extremely small
(0.0001), both of which suggest good matching qual-
ity and that the covariates are balanced well. For details
of the matching quality tests, see Table A1 in Online
Appendix A (available as supplemental material at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2016.1084). With the matched
sample, we implemented the two-step Heckman selec-
tion model for the likelihood and amount of donation as
described above.
Results
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix are pre-
sented in Table 2. We can see that the correlation
coefficients between the explanatory variables are rel-
atively small with the largest one being É00476 (per-
centage of shares owned by the five largest shareholders
and years since listed). We checked variance inflation
factors (VIFs) and found that the highest VIF among
those in our model was 2.828, well below the gen-
eral cutoff 10; therefore multicollinearity does not pose
a serious concern. Overall, 60% of sampled firm/years
donated between 2001 and 2012, 12.7% of chairpersons
have ascribed bureaucratic connections, and 23.7% have
achieved political connections, while 3.4% have both.
Table 3 presents the results from the multiple regres-
sion models: models 1–3 present the results of the first
step results of the two-step Heckman selection model,
i.e., the probit model with random effects for the likeli-
hood of donation; models 4–6 present the results of the
second step results of the two-step Heckman selection
model, i.e., the fixed effects linear model for the amount
of donation by controlling for the inverse Mill’s ratio
calculated from the first step.
Hypothesis 1 posits the buffering effect of ascribed
bureaucratic connections. The results from both model 3
and model 6 provide strong and consistent support for
our hypothesis: firms whose chairpersons have gov-
ernment working experience are less likely to donate
(Ç=É00532, p < 0001), and the amount of donation of
these firms is also smaller than that of firms without such
political connections (Ç=É30737, p < 0001). Hypothe-
sis 1 is supported.
Hypothesis 2 argues for the binding effect of achieved
political connections on donation. The results show that
firms whose chairpersons have achieved political con-
nections are more likely to donate (Ç= 00927, p< 0001)
and in greater amount (Ç= 40984, p < 0001). Hypothe-
sis 2 is supported. Thus, our empirical results reveal the
different impacts (and functions) of two types of politi-
cal connections upon firm donation.
Hypotheses 3A and 3B propose the moderating role of
level of state monopoly of industry on the relationship
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Table 3 Determinants of the Likelihood and Amount of Donation by Propensity Score Matching
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable Donor Amount of donation
Both political connections É00018 É00013 É00012 É00068 É00088 É00073
4002845 4002925 4002915 4000735 4000785 4000825
CEO age 00021⇤⇤ 00023⇤⇤ 00022⇤⇤ 00002 00004 00004
4000075 4000075 4000075 4000195 4000195 4000195
CEO gender É00084 É00100 É00100 É00181 É00201 É00184
4000615 4000625 4000625 4001715 4001715 4001735
CEO educational attainment É00208 É00190 É00191 É00219 É00179 É00190
4001895 4001905 4001895 4003685 4003685 4003695
CEO tenure 00012 00009 00008 00049 00036 00022
4000265 4000265 4000265 4001055 4001065 4001075
Duality of chair and CEO 00030 00030 00035 00318⇤ 00521⇤⇤ 00508⇤⇤
4001355 4001365 4001355 4001605 4001835 4001845
Chair has sales/marketing 00016 00031 00046 00635+ 00735⇤ 00730⇤
background 4002215 4002215 4002205 4003565 4003575 4003585
Firm size 00157⇤⇤ 00151⇤⇤ 00150⇤⇤ 00000 00004 00004
4000275 4000275 4000265 4000735 4000735 4000745
Percentage of shares owned 00505 00619 00639 00160 00000 00028
by 5 largest shareholders 4004265 4004275 4004265 4009245 4009255 4009355
Years since listed É00057⇤⇤ É00058⇤⇤ É00061⇤⇤ É00128⇤ É00293⇤⇤ É00289⇤⇤
4000175 4000175 4000175 4000515 4000995 4001005
Firm performance 10154⇤ 10116⇤ 10162⇤ 10685+ 10524+ 10457
4004575 4004565 4004565 4009065 4008885 4009105
Slack resource 00002 00002 00002 00003 00003 00003
4000035 4000035 4000045 4000045 4000045 4000055
Advertising intensity É10031⇤ É00994⇤ É00938⇤ É20152 É20002 É10962
4005035 4004405 4004285 4204785 4204825 4204965
Average donation likelihood of 40143⇤⇤ 40205⇤⇤ 40192⇤⇤
firms in industry 4004785 4004815 4004795
Average donation amount of 00471⇤⇤ 00483⇤⇤ 00487⇤⇤
firms in industry 4000735 4000745 4000755
Ascribed bureaucratic É00376⇤ É00532⇤⇤ É10060⇤ É30737⇤⇤
connection (H1) 4001785 4001935 4004565 4101445
Achieved political connection (H2) 00357⇤ 00927⇤⇤ 10602⇤⇤ 40984⇤⇤
4001475 4003135 4004875 4106425
Level of state monopoly É00078+ É00120⇤ É10119⇤ É10239+
4000435 4000595 4005585 4007115
Quality of regional É00059⇤ É00061⇤ É00517⇤ É00546⇤
market development (reverse coded) 4000265 4000285 4002355 4002435
Ascribed bureaucratic connection 10785⇤⇤ 20763⇤⇤
⇥State monopoly (H3A) 4005985 4100035
Achieved political connection 20242⇤⇤ 20093⇤⇤
⇥State monopoly (H3B) 4008375 4007185
Ascribed bureaucratic connection É00138⇤⇤ É00109⇤⇤
⇥Quality of regional market development (H4A) 4000315 4000295
Achieved political connection É00103⇤⇤ É00094⇤⇤
⇥Quality of regional market development (H4B) 4000285 4000315
Inverse Mill’s ratio É00348 É00265 É00294
4002745 4002775 4002815
Intercept É30716⇤⇤ É30893⇤⇤ É30578⇤⇤ 60989⇤⇤ 110413⇤⇤ 110267⇤⇤
4007675 4007985 4008145 4201695 4207505 4208705
Number of observations 3,768 3,768 3,768 2,418 2,418 2,418
ï2 2310925 2750976 2970445 710884 930135 1140104
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses.
+p < 0010; ⇤p < 0005; ⇤⇤p < 0001.
Do
wn
loa
de
d f
rom
 in
for
ms
.or
g b
y [
13
2.2
36
.27
.11
1] 
on
 21
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
6, 
at 
05
:17
 . F
or 
pe
rso
na
l u
se 
on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Zhang, Marquis, and Qiao: A Study of Corporate Charitable Donations of Chinese Firms
1318 Organization Science 27(5), pp. 1307–1324, © 2016 INFORMS
between political connections and corporate charitable
donation. In contrast to the negative effect of ascribed
bureaucratic connections upon donation (main effect),
the interaction between chairs’ ascribed bureaucratic
connections and the level of state monopoly is signifi-
cantly positive, on both the likelihood (Ç= 10785, p <
0001) and the amount of donation (Ç = 20763, p <
0001). This means that the buffering effect of execu-
tives’ ascribed bureaucratic connections from pressure
to donate is weaker in more state-monopolized indus-
tries. So H3A is supported. The same positive inter-
action effect is found for the interaction term between
chairs’ achieved political connections and the level of
state monopoly; both coefficient estimates on the likeli-
hood (Ç= 20242, p < 0001) and the amount of donation
(Ç= 20093, p< 0001) are significantly positive, suggest-
ing that the binding effect of executives’ achieved politi-
cal connections on donation is stronger for firms in more
state-monopolized industries. Thus H3B is supported.
Figure 2, panels (a) and (b), visualizes how the types
of ties interact with state monopoly of industry. We put
level of state monopoly on the x-axis and used two
lines to indicate the predicted probability of donation by
firms with and without political connections. As shown
in Figure 2(a), firms with ascribed connections are less
likely to donate in more competitive industries (i.e., they
buffer), but when the level of state monopoly increases,
such buffering effect becomes weaker (H3A) as the slope
becomes positive („= 00258 with p< 00001). Similarly,
Figure 2(b) shows that firms with achieved political con-
nections are more likely to donate, particularly in indus-
tries with a higher level of state monopoly, suggesting
that the binding effect of achieved political connections
is stronger in state-monopolized industries (H3B) as the
slope is positive („= 00879 with p < 00001).
Figure 2 The Moderating Effect of State Monopoly of Industry
(a) Ascribed bureaucratic connection (b) Achieved political connection
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Level of state monopoly
Confidence interval Ascribed bureaucratic
connection = 0
Confidence interval Ascribed bureaucratic
connection = 1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Level of state monopoly
Confidence interval Achieved political
connection = 0
Confidence interval Achieved political
connection = 1
Note. The figure is based on model 3 of Table 3.
Hypotheses 4A and 4B examine the moderating
effects of the quality of regional market development
on the relationship between political connections and
corporate charitable donation. The results show that the
interaction effect between chairs’ (both types of) polit-
ical connections and quality of regional market devel-
opment (a higher score means lower quality) negatively
affect both the likelihood and the amount of donation
significantly. These indicate that the buffering effect of
executives’ ascribed bureaucratic connections against
pressure to donate is stronger and the binding effect of
executives’ achieved political connections to donate is
weaker for firms in regions with low level of market
development. Hypothesis 4A and 4B are thus supported.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) illustrate the interaction effects
visually. Figure 3(a) indicates that ascribed bureau-
cratic connections buffer in all regions, and the effect
becomes stronger when the quality of market develop-
ment decreases (H4B; „ = É00937 with p < 00001).
Figure 3(b) shows that the binding effect of achieved
political connection to donate is seriously weakened in
regions with lower quality of market development (H4B)
(„=É00302 with p< 00001), but in regions with higher
quality of market development, firms with achieved con-
nections are more likely to donate.
Based on model 6 (Table 3), holding other things
constant, we calculated the predicted donation amount
of firms with political connections. Among those that
have donated, firms with ascribed bureaucratic connec-
tions donate ¥48,260 (US$6,539) less, whereas those with
achievedpolitical connectionsdonate¥62,891 (US$8,522)
more, compared to their respective counterparts. A stan-
dard deviation increase in level of statemonopoly increases
the amount of donation for firms with ascribed bureau-
cratic connections by ¥8,242 (US$1,117), and increases
Do
wn
loa
de
d f
rom
 in
for
ms
.or
g b
y [
13
2.2
36
.27
.11
1] 
on
 21
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
6, 
at 
05
:17
 . F
or 
pe
rso
na
l u
se 
on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Zhang, Marquis, and Qiao: A Study of Corporate Charitable Donations of Chinese Firms
Organization Science 27(5), pp. 1307–1324, © 2016 INFORMS 1319
Figure 3 The Moderating Effect of Quality of Regional Market Development
0 5 10 15
Quality of regional market development (reverse coded)
0 5 10 15
Quality of regional market development (reverse coded)
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(a) Ascribed bureaucratic connection (b) Achieved political connection
Confidence interval Ascribed bureaucratic
connection = 0
Confidence interval Ascribed bureaucratic
connection = 1
Confidence interval Achieved political
connection = 0
Confidence interval Achieved political
connection = 1
Note. The figure is based on model 3 of Table 3.
the amount of donation for firms with achieved political
connections by ¥6,244 (US$846). In contrast, a standard
deviation increase in quality of regional market devel-
opment (i.e., less market-oriented regions) decreases the
amount of donation for firms with ascribed bureau-
cratic connections by ¥3,156 (US$428), and decreases
the amount of donation for firms with achieved political
connections by ¥2,722 (US$369).
As for the control variables, the results show that
firm size is positively associated with the likelihood of
donation. Newly listed firms are more likely to donate
and donate in larger amount, probably because they
are more likely to comply with external pressures due
to recent IPO or they are still establishing their pub-
lic image. Financial performance (ROA) has a positive
impact upon the likelihood of donation, which is consis-
tent with Wang and Qian (2011). We also find evidence
that firms with higher advertising intensity are less likely
to donate. This result may suggest that when donation
is somewhat coercive or demanded by the government,
it does not function as a complement to advertising like
it does in developed economies (Servaes and Tamayo
2013). Finally, the percentage of firms that donated in
the same industry and the average amount of donation in
the same industry are positively associated with the like-
lihood and amount of donation respectively, indicating
an imitation effect.
Further Analyses and Robustness Checks
We also conducted a number of additional analyses to
check the robustness of the results. One issue is that
we cannot be fully sure of firm motivation and whether
they donated voluntarily or were forced to donate. To
better understand this issue, we attempt to identify “vol-
untary donation” by (1) the consistency of donation
(whether a firm donated every year) and (2) whether the
amount of donation was relatively large (e.g., the highest
half, quartile, deciles, quintile, or above median, etc.),
assuming that consistent donors and those who donate
larger amounts are more likely to donate voluntarily.
The results presented in Table B1 in Online Appendix B
show that firms whose chairpersons have achieved polit-
ical connections are more likely to donate voluntarily by
this definition. Such effect is strengthened in more state-
monopolized industries and weakened in regions with
poorer market development.
We also conducted subsample regressions in case in-
dustrial and regional differences are associated with
political connections as well as corporate charitable do-
nations. First, we split the sample into manufacturing
and nonmanufacturing industries (Li and Tang 2010).
Second, we divide our sample into three economic
regions: east, middle, and west (Bhalla et al. 2003).
The split sample results across these different indus-
tries and regions are reported in the last five columns of
Table B1 in Online Appendix B and are consistent with
our main results.
We further explored the impact of the political
rank of the chairperson upon donation. We coded the
political rank of the ascribed bureaucratic connection
from 1 (below the township level) to 9 (the provincial/
ministerial level), and those without such connections
are coded 0. The results (presented in Table B2 in Online
Appendix B) indicate that the ascribed bureaucratic con-
nection with consideration of rank has a stronger buffer-
ing effect; i.e., the higher the political rank, the stronger
the buffering effect. This suggests that former govern-
ment officials with higher political rank are more pow-
erful in protecting their firms’ interests by defying rent
expropriation.
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Last, as an alternative to address the endogeneity
issue, we also use the instrumental variable approach
and found that the results are consistent with those by
propensity score matching. Details of our selection of
instrumental variables and the corresponding results are
presented in Table C1 in Online Appendix C.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our research addresses an important theoretical puzzle
concerning the effect of political connections on firm
behavior; i.e., do they buffer the firm from or bind the
firm to the government? We distinguish two types of
political connections—ascribed bureaucratic connections
and achieved political connections—and reveal their dif-
ferent functions. We further show that whether political
connections buffer the firm from or bind the firm to the
government is contingent upon the firm’s institutional
context, including the level of state monopoly of indus-
try and the quality of regional market development.
Below, we discuss our theoretical contributions to
research on political connections, the institutional con-
tingencies of political connections, and, more generally,
the relationship between corporate social responsibility
and corporate political activities.
Beyond the Double-Edged Function of
Political Connections
Our findings corroborate prior conceptualizations of
the double-edged function of political connections,
but go beyond this conceptualization by showing that
it is not that each specific tie can have opposing
functions, but that there are systematic differences
between types of ties and institutional contingencies
upon which ties have a buffering or binding function.
As noted, we found that ascribed bureaucratic connec-
tions are more likely to serve as a buffer; in con-
trast, achieved political connections are more likely
to create binding effects. Such evidence indicates that
the two types of political connections mean different
things, indicate different relationships (with the gov-
ernment), and function differently. In general, ascribed
bureaucratic connections provide power and leverage
to buffer against external impositions, while achieved
political connections, beyond their instrumental value
to protect firms from administrative harassment, bind
firms to meet government and social expectations. In
addition, successful entrepreneurs’ prosocial tendencies
and legitimacy-seeking behavior (Li and Liang 2015),
together with government’s efforts to incorporate suc-
cessful entrepreneurs to the political system (Dickson
2003), also strengthen such a binding effect.
More importantly, our study suggests a bidirectional
influence in the relationship between business and gov-
ernment, embodied by political connections. Political
connections not only provide channels for business to
gain benefits and protect its own interest, but also create
channels/avenues for government to influence/penetrate
business. As Shleifer and Vishny (1994) emphasize,
while firms might get benefits/rents from political con-
nections, politicians themselves will extract at least some
of the rents generated by the connections. To gain
and maintain political appointments, business executives
must take the government’s concern into consideration,
e.g., actively share responsibilities with the government
and take the lead in following the government’s calls.
As a result, firms seeking political embeddedness might
also risk losing certain autonomy and resources.
It is important to emphasize that this conceptualiza-
tion of buffering versus binding effects of political con-
nections is not just specific to the Chinese context. As
the recent review by Mellahi et al. (2016) indicates,
buffering is common around the world. For instance,
Claessens et al. (2008) argues that political connections
shield Brazilian firms from government demands, and
similar results are found in the study by Barth et al.
(2008) across 150 countries. On the other hand, binding
effects has also been found in a wide range of contexts
(Choi and Thum 2009, Robinson and Verdier 2013). For
example, in France, politically connected firms are more
active in reducing the unemployment rate in exchange
for benefits such as tax breaks and subsidies (Bertrand
et al. 2007).
Institutional Contingency of Political Connections
We further find that the function of political connections
is contingent upon institutional contexts, and different
institutions influence organizations differently (Sun et al.
2012). These institutional factors affect the extent to
which a firm depends on the state or market to succeed,
which in turn determines the necessity (and value) of
using corporate giving to maintain political connections,
as well as the necessity and the feasibility of defying
government demands. In other words, institutional fac-
tors shape the extent to which a firm should consider the
government as an important stakeholder in their deci-
sion making.
A unique aspect of our study is that we document
the different moderating effects of industry and region.
While prior research has postulated important insti-
tutional effects stemming either from industry (e.g.,
DiMaggio and Powell 1983) or region (e.g., Marquis
and Battilana 2009), there are few studies contrasting
the two. Analyzing and comparing these two institutions
is thus both theoretically and practically important since
virtually all firms simultaneously face institutional pres-
sures from both industry and region. Different politi-
cal systems and institutional arrangements may create
different institutional pressures from region and indus-
try, and/or different combinations of the two in terms
of government regulation. As we show, in more state-
monopolized industries, both types of political connec-
tions positively influence donation, whereas in more
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competitive industries, both types of political connec-
tions are more likely to serve as buffers. In contrast, the
moderating role of region is strikingly different: in less
market-oriented regions, both types of political connec-
tions work as buffers; in more market-oriented regions,
achieved political connections significantly bind firms to
donate (Figure 3(b)), while ascribed bureaucratic con-
nections still buffer firms from the donation pressure
(Figure 3(a)).
Such different impacts of industry and region largely
result from the differing nature of their associated insti-
tutional pressures. As we discussed previously, the task
environment of industry generates stronger and con-
sistent resource dependence of the focal firm upon
the government, while the institutional environment
of region generates fragmented, inconsistent, and rela-
tively weaker resource dependence of the focal firm on
the government. Meanwhile, both industry and region
embody variation of state presence (i.e., state-monopo-
lized versus competitive industries; less market-oriented
regions versus more market-oriented regions). Based on
our conceptualization of these two different dimensions,
as well as our empirical findings, we can tentatively
classify three institutional conditions under which polit-
ical connections function differently, thus providing a
general framework to encompass both industrial and
regional effects.
First, in situations with strong and consistent resource
dependence of firms upon the government (such as state-
monopolized industries), organizations must proactively
pursue competitive advantage through cultivating and
maintaining political connections; meanwhile, they can-
not afford the cost of defying government demands.
Under such conditions, political connections serve as
conduit or bridge for further political advantages, which
is why we observe that both types of political connec-
tions facilitate donation.
Second, in situations with moderate resource depen-
dence of corporations upon the state, such as in
competitive industries, or situations with multiple and
fragmented environment constituents (Greenwood et al.
2011), such as less market-oriented regions, it is both
necessary and feasible for organizations to resist govern-
ment demands to protect firm interests. In these situa-
tions, political connections thus serve as a buffer, helping
firms protect their interests from rent expropriation (Xin
and Pearce 1996).
Last, in situations where firms’ dependence upon the
state is weak and the market plays a more important
role in shaping competition, i.e., in more market-oriented
regions, executives with achieved political connections
may be more aware of using donation as a market-
ing tool or have more latitude to express their intrin-
sic interests, for example, donating out of a high CSR
awareness or prosocial duty (Li and Liang 2015). In this
context the entrepreneurs/firms may behave like what is
expected in the West, where discretionary philanthropy
prevails (Galaskiewicz 1997). Future research can inves-
tigate whether this is the case and whether this will be
the trend with the progress of China’s market transition.
Our conceptualization of different institutional condi-
tions thus enables us to better understand the subtlety of
the shifting function of certain political connections and
how firms use their connections strategically. For exam-
ple, ascribed bureaucratic connections mainly buffer, but
in state-monopolized industries, they actually facilitate
donation, while achieved political connections in gen-
eral create a binding effect, but such connections func-
tion more as buffer in less market-oriented regions to
protect firms from rent expropriation. This once again
demonstrates the contingent nature of political connec-
tions as well as the institutional bases of firm strategy
(Sun et al. 2012).
Relationship Between CSR and CPA
Considering the overlap between the social and politi-
cal aspects of corporate strategies, scholars have noticed
that business organizations tend to integrate or align their
CSR with CPA to pursue competitive advantage (Baron
and Diermeier 2007, Werner 2015). But the relation-
ship between the two is less clear (Delmas et al. 2016,
Mellahi et al. 2016, Sun et al. 2012). Some studies sug-
gest that the two activities complement each other, e.g.,
CSR facilitates corporate political access (McWilliams
et al. 2002, Werner 2015). Others suggest that given that
both CSR and CPA are not cost-free, the two nonmarket
strategies can also serve as substitutes (Wang and Qian
2011); that is, if firms consider one strategy to be effec-
tive in achieving/protecting their interests, why would
they bother to spend more resources on the other?
Our study contributes to this literature by differentiat-
ing types of political connections and institutional con-
ditions. We show that ascribed bureaucratic connections
serve more as a substitute to donation, while achieved
political connections are more likely to serve as a com-
plement to donation. In addition, whether CSR and CPA
complement or substitute each other is largely a result
of firms’ level of dependence on the government: in sit-
uations where firms highly depend on the government
for survival and success (such as in state-monopolized
industries), charitable donations serve as a complement
to maintain/strengthen political connections, whereas in
situations where firms depend more on the market for
success, political connections substitute charitable dona-
tions. In sum, donations actually serve as another tool in
a firm’s strategic and political toolbox, with firms utiliz-
ing it depending on the relative strengths and weaknesses
of their other political resources as well as institutional
conditions.
Limitations and Future Research
Our study differentiates the different natures/functions
of political connections with an application to corporate
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charitable donations. Future research can investigate
and extend our findings in a number of directions.
First, future research can examine other types of polit-
ical connections and decipher their functions, such as
political connections cultivated through political contri-
butions, intimate relationships, and family ties (Faccio
2006). Future research can also examine the function of
expired political appointments—after executives’ tenures
of political appointment are over. Second, while this
research chooses charitable donation as a research phe-
nomenon to examine the differing impacts of politi-
cal connections, future research can investigate other
organizational behaviors on which political connections
may have varying influence. Third, research on the
impact of political connections on corporate charitable
donations or other CSR behaviors (or the relationship
between CPA and CSR) can extend our findings to con-
texts beyond China. Finally, fieldwork and executive
interviews are needed to better understand the differ-
ent natures of political connections and their impact on
firms’ behavior, as well as the underlying motives of
charitable donation.
Conclusions
Research on political connections typically focuses on
either their benefits for firms (i.e., buffering them from
the government) or their binding effect for firms to meet
government expectations. Yet, research has not yet clar-
ified the puzzle of what types of political connections
are more likely to function as buffers and what types
of political connections are more likely to bind, and
the institutional conditions that affect these relationships.
Our study addresses this puzzle by differentiating two
types of political connections and identifying two insti-
tutional contingencies. Our study thus goes beyond prior
conceptualizations of political connections as a double-
edged sword and shows that political connections actu-
ally provide two distinct influences: for government to
influence corporations and for firms to influence the gov-
ernment. More importantly, we show that the function
of political connections is not fixed; on the contrary,
it varies with institutional conditions. Both government
and business can be strategic and instrumental in exploit-
ing such interorganizational linkages, and both face
ongoing challenges to manage the tension between coop-
eration and conflict.
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Endnotes
1More than half of all donations go to education, poverty alle-
viation, or disaster relief, which are considered government
duties.
2See, for example, Zhang 2012.
3Though “forced donation” may be more pronounced in China,
the political nature of CSR activities like philanthropy is not
China unique; that is, CSR may be firms’ response to pressures
generated not just by NGOs and social activists, but also by
the government (Baron et al. 2011).
4For the delegates to PC or CPPCC at city level or above, the
term is five years. For sub–city level, i.e., county or township
level, the term is three years.
5As Chinese tradition does not encourage lawsuits and the
legal apparatus is not effective, individuals/firms develop many
informal ways to solve conflict (Fei 1992).
6To maintain consistency on estimation for the second depen-
dent variable, the amount of donation, which requires the two-
step Heckman selection model, we utilized probit models with
random effects for the likelihood of donation as the first step.
7We obtained similar results by excluding firms with both
types of political connections before implementing PSM and
obtained similar results as those reported.
8We employed nearest-neighbor matching without replacement
and a set caliper (0.25 standard deviation) to determine which
propensity scores were sufficiently high for observations in the
control group to be included in the matched sample. While we
followed the common rule of thumb to set the caliper to 0.25
standard deviation (Choi et al. 2014), the results stay similar
if we set the caliper to 0.20 or 0.15 standard deviation.
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